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2Abstract
This article addresses the question of how competition for investments among firms in a
certain industry impacts their capital structure. We develop a new modelling framework,
which simulates financial variables of a set of firms in a given sector. We use it to analyse
how firms are competing for new investments. The leverage of the firm impacts its flexibility
to react upon investment opportunities, and we show how it can be optimised to maximise the
firm’s growth. As an illustration, we then apply the model on a set of European airlines and
global pharmaceutical companies. The novelty that this paper introduces is the explicit
modelling of the interaction among several companies. Invariably, the literature on optimal
capital structure focuses on a single company optimising its capital structure in a world where
the actions of its competitors are exogenous. Corporate Finance theory states that the
optimisation of investment opportunities is one of three drivers of optimal leverage (together
with reduction of the distress costs or tax expenditures). Our results suggest that the optimal
capital structure should incorporate the competitive position of the firm as well as the
availability of investment opportunities. Our framework allows corporate decision makers
(CEOs and CFOs) to incorporate these aspects in their decision making.
Our main conclusion is that the leverage of the company impacts its ability to capture
investment opportunities in a world where such opportunities are scarce. Companies with
very low or very high leverage have reduced flexibility to invest, due to a high hurdle rate.
Reducing the volatility of cash flows via hedging generally improves the ability to invest.
The ability to invest in random growth opportunities is particularly important in mature
industries, where investment opportunities are limited. Finally, if more flexible companies
exploit investment opportunities this reduces the investment options for their less flexible
competitors.
Keywords: Modigliani-Miller, corporate investment policy, capital structure, WACC,
hurdle rate, financial flexibility, Monte Carlo simulation, optimal leverage
JEL Codes: G31, G32
31. Introduction
The topic of optimal capital structure6 has been well-studied since 1958, when the original
Modigliani-Miller theorem7 appeared. Since then, many articles have tried to answer the
question of how companies choose their target leverage from both theoretical and empirical
perspectives.
A significant proportion of research on capital structure8 focuses on the “Trade-off Theory”
whereby a company decides on its leverage so that the financial benefits of holding debt due
to the tax shield compensate the costs of financial distress and bankruptcy.
In order to be realistic and take into account the whole economic cycle, Trade-off models
have to observe the firm over multiple time periods, which normally require Monte Carlo
simulations9. Two such models were described in the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance
by Opler, Saron and Titman10 (1997) and Heine and Harbus11 (2002). (from here on referred
to as “Opler et al.” and “Heine and Harbus”)
Other sources12, take a more pragmatic approach and also consider non-financial aspects such
as target credit rating and the related value of financial flexibility. In our experience, from
discussions with some of the largest European public companies, non-financial aspects are
paramount in the minds of CFOs and Treasurers. For example, the Treasurer of one of the
largest consumer good companies expressed the following view to one of the authors: “We
believe that a leading company in our sector should have a lower leverage than our
competitors in order to be able to benefit from and drive consolidation in our sector”. In
practice, how should the company take into account the nature of its sector (e.g.: growth,
fragmentation, cyclicality, etc.) and its own competitive position in determining its optimal
leverage?
The main goal of the present article is to answer this last question in a systematic way. We
model explicitly the financial flexibility resulting from lower credit risk and leverage. How
6 For a good recent overview of literature in this field, see H. Kent Baker and Gerald S. Martin, Editors, Capital
Structure and Corporate Financing Decisions (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2011).
7 Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of
Investment”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 48, No.3, (1958), pp.261-297.
8 Other alternative theories, i.e. Pecking Order, Signalling and Market Timing models are all described in Baker
and Martin (2011).
9 Unless assumptions are made on the functional form of debt payments, in which case elegant closed form
solutions can be derived. See, for example, Hayne E. Leyland and Klaus Bjerre Toft, “Optimal Capital Structure,
Endogenous Bankruptcy, and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. LI, No.3,
(1996), pp.987-1012.
10 Tim C. Opler, Michael Saron and Sheridan Titman, “Designing Capital Structure to Create Shareholder
Value”, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 10, No.1, (1997), pp.21-32.
11 Roger Heine and Fredric Harbus, “Toward a More Complete Model of Optimal Capital Structure”, Journal of
Applied Corporate Finance, Vol.15.No.1,(2002),pp.31-45.
12 For example Anil Shivdasani and Marc Zenner, “How To Choose a Capital Structure: Navigating the Debt-
Equity Decision”, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol.17, No.1, (2005), pp.26-35.
4exactly do we define this flexibility and how do we model it? By flexibility13, we mean the
ability of the firm to react to unexpected external growth opportunities. Taking an example
from the airline industry, let us imagine that a new type of aircraft engine is invented, which
consumes 50% less fuel than existing engines. However, the new engines are more costly to
produce, adding an extra 25% to the initial cost of the plane. Moreover, the process is so new
and complicated that the manufacturers can only produce 100 new efficient planes every year.
If an airline decides to invest in the new engines it will initially incur higher costs, however
over time it will be able to offer cheaper tickets and therefore capture a higher market share.
More importantly, since the manufacturing capacity is limited, the first airline to order the
new efficient planes will take away a certain amount of potential growth opportunities from
its competitors. Similar situations are common across many industries and are characterised
by two features. First, the unexpected or unpredictable nature of the investment, which the
company has to finance at the outset, but which is expected to result in a higher return over
time. Second, the approximately zero-sum nature of the growth opportunities in a mature
industry: total revenues are constant or are growing slowly14, so that those companies that are
able to capture the new opportunities early reduce the potential growth alternatives for their
competitors. The way we address this flexibility is to simulate the decision processes in
parallel for a finite number of companies, which are calibrated to the real firms in a given
sector.
We start by defining precisely the objectives of this study. Details of our model are described
in Section 3. Section 4 shows the results of the model for the European airlines and global
pharmaceutical companies and Section 5 the broader implications for financial policy. All
technical details are in the Appendices.
2. Objectives of this study
It has been understood for a long time15 that the behaviour of sector peers impacts any given
corporation’s financial policy. In other words, financial directors and other decision makers
often consider the behaviour of their competitors before establishing target leverage, target
rating or risk management strategy. However, these decisions are by no means identical
across the sector.
As an example, let us consider the net leverage (net Debt/Enterprise Value) and credit rating
in two different sectors: global pharmaceutical companies and European airlines16 in Table 1
and Table 2.
13 This topic has been studied in several articles. See e.g. DeAngelo, H., L. DeAngelo, 2007, Capital Structure,
Payout Policy, and Financial Flexibility, Marshall School of Business Working Paper No. FBE 02-06. Available
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=916093.
14 See e.g. Quirry, P., Y.Le Fur, A.Salvi, M. Dallochio and P. Vernimmen, 2014, “Corporate Finance: Theory
and Practice”, Fourth Edition, John Wiley & Sons, 2014.
15 See e.g. Mark .T. Leary and Michael. R. Roberts (2014), “Do peer firms affect corporate financial policy?”,
Journal of Finance, vol.69, pages 139 to 177.
16 Source of the data is Bloomberg as of 15 August 2016.
5Company Net debt/EV17 S&P rating Moody’s rating
Pfizer 7% AA A1
Johnson & Johnson -6% AAA Aaa
GlaxoSmithKline 12% A+ A2
Merck & Co. 8% AA A1
AstraZeneca 9% A- A3
Bristol-Myers Squibb -2% A+ A2
Novartis 7% AA- Aa3
Roche 6% AA A1
Sanofi 6% AA A1
Bayer 19% A- A3
average 7% AA- A1
St.dev 7% 1.9 notches 1.7 notches
Table 1 - Global pharmaceutical companies
Company Net debt/EV S&P rating Moody’s rating
Air France-KLM 72%
Lufthansa 40% BBB- Ba1
IAG 22%
Ryanair -2% BBB+
EasyJet -8%
Turk Hava Yollari 64% BB- Ba2
Air Berlin 92%
SAS 15% B B2
Finnair -109%
Aer Lingus18 -26%
average 16% BB+ Ba2
St.dev 58% 3.1 notches 2.1 notches
Table 2 - European airlines
We have chosen three parameters to compare credit risk: Net leverage, S&P and Moody’s
rating. Considering these particular measures, we would like to illustrate the two points we
make. First, we notice that the average rating in the airline sector is 7 notches lower than in
the pharmaceutical sector. Secondly, there is a considerable discrepancy of ratings within the
sectors. The first fact may be explained by the different nature of the pharmaceutical vs.
airline industries, whereas the second one is of more interest to us. What does make Johnson
& Johnson to decide on an extremely conservative financial policy with AAA/Aaa rating,
while Bayer, ostensibly in the same sector, is 6 notches lower at A-/A3? There are two
answers to this. On the one hand similarities between companies depend on the exact
definition of the sector. For example, Johnson & Johnson produces different products from
Bayer, so the two companies are not directly comparable. However, on the other hand, the
decision on the capital structure, leverage and rating is a consequence of a large number of
17 Enterprise Value (EV) = Net Debt + Market Capitalisation.
18 Aer Lingus was acquired by IAG in September 2015. Here we are showing the 2014 data.
6factors, some of which the firm does not control. Besides these answers, is there a more
systematic way to decide on an optimal capital structure? What does exactly impact the
capital structure choices of the firm, how does the interaction with its peers affect those
choices, and what impact does the choice have on the evolution of key financial variables,
such as the firm’s market share, profit margin, etc.? Our objective is to set out a model that
can answer these questions.
3. The model
We develop a model which describes the interaction among firms in a given industrial sector
and in particular their competition for new investments. In the next section, we show the
results of our model for the European airline and global pharmaceutical industries. Our first
objective is to produce a realistic view of various industrial sectors and we evaluate the
model based on its ability to predict future development of various financial variables such as
market share of individual companies over time. However, the main focus of the model is to
quantify the impact of leverage on company’s ability to capture investment opportunities. Of
course, a compromise has to be made between the model complexity and its ability to
describe the actual dynamic in an industry.
In a similar way to Opler et al. and Heine and Harbus we use a Monte Carlo simulation of
financial variables over a multi-year period. In addition, we simulate the joint time evolution
of a number of firms. Then, the model is calibrated to the initial state of the firms in the past
(in our example at year end of 2009), and consequently, we use it to simulate future
development of key financial variables: Revenue, Capital, profit, Net debt etc. annually from
2009 to 2015. In this section, we outline the main idea of the model. For more details of the
model procedure, see the Appendices.
3.1. Financial variables
Key financial variables19 modelled for each firm over time are:
 Income and cash flow statements:
o Revenue
o Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPAT)
o Operating margin
o Free Cash Flows to the Firm (FCFF)
 Balance sheet:
o Invested capital
o Cash
o Net debt
19 We find that this set is sufficiently large to allow for the description of companies in the airline and
pharmaceutical sectors while being sufficiently small to keep model outputs intuitive and computationally
tractable.
7Unlike Heine and Harbus, we do not model an explicit set of market variables: currencies and
interest rates. All of our financial variables are in the reporting currency of the company and
their volatility is based on historical distribution, as described in the Appendices.
Similarly to Heine and Harbus, we assume that all investments are funded by either the
existing cash, free cash flows generated by the business or new debt, but not by equity
issuance20.
We introduce two key modelling novelties. First, we simulate several firms at the same time.
For example, in the European airlines, we simulate 10 publicly listed airlines from Table 2
over a period of 6 years, from 2009 to 2015.
Second, in order to take into account the value of flexibility resulting from a conservative
financial structure, we model explicitly the competition between companies for investment
opportunities. We assume that in a mature industry, investment opportunities are scarce and
the competition among firms is akin to a zero-sum game, i.e. since the market size is at best
slowly growing, one company’s investment will reduce growth opportunities for its
competitors. At every point during the cycle, companies are randomly offered investment
opportunities, whose size, expected return and return volatility have been calibrated to the
past. Furthermore, we assume that the companies decide on whether to take the opportunity
depending on whether it will increase the expected Economic Profit (EP) created:
EP = Capital * (ROIC – WACC) (1)
Here, ROIC is Return On Invested Capital and WACC is the Weighted Average Cost of
Capital. In a world with taxes and non-zero costs of distress, companies with different
leverage will have different WACC, which determines the hurdle rate on new investments, as
shown in the equation above. Therefore the leverage of the firms affects the ability of the
firm to invest profitably.
For the sake of simplicity, we empirically derive the WACC as a function of leverage21.
3.2. WACC
We derive the formula relating WACC to net leverage by fitting the cost of equity and debt
separately to 1800 rated22 non-financial corporations from the S&P Global index, from 2000
to 2009. In Figure 1, we are showing the best-fit of WACC as a function of leverage. Red
dots correspond to average WACC for European airlines over this period. Ideally, we would
like to compute the fit only considering European airlines in the sample, but lack of data in
20 In Appendix A, we are showing to what extent this is accurate among the companies in our data sample.
21 WACC and Cost of debt do not depend only on leverage but on sector, year, etc. Limitations of this
approximation and ways of improving it are discussed in Appendix C.
22 We exclude non-rated companies in order to eliminate the ‘non-rated’ premium, normally observed in their
credit spreads.
8the high leverage section of the graph forces us to extrapolate the WACC using the complete
set of companies.
For our data set, the leverage at the minimum WACC is near 73%.
Figure 1 - WACC as a function of leverage (Net Debt/Enterprise Value)
The firm invests as long as the expected ROIC net of WACC on the marginal investment is
higher than the change in WACC applied to the whole invested capital of the firm23. This
condition24 can approximately be written as:
Expected return > ΔWACC + Cost of new capital  (2) 
The shape of the WACC curve determines the hurdle rate, as shown in Figure 1, where we
denote by ΔWACC the change in the cost of the existing capital due to new investment.  
We see that for the companies with low positive leverage on the left side of the graph,
ΔWACC < 0. This means that the hurdle rate on new investments is lower than the cost of 
new capital, which helps low-leveraged companies to capture more investments. Moreover,
companies that are to the right of the minimum have ΔWACC > 0, which means that the 
hurdle rate on new investments is higher than the Cost of the new capital, thereby reducing
the possibility of investments for highly leveraged companies.
The conclusion is that, ceteris paribus, companies with a lower leverage will be able to
accept more growth opportunities than their competitors and will grow at a higher rate.
3.3. Investment opportunities
Interaction between companies is modelled through random investment opportunities offered
to companies in the sector. Each investment opportunity is specified by two parameters:
average investment size as a proportion of total capital (g) and expected investment return (y).
23 See Léautier, Thomas-Olivier, 2007, Corporate Risk Management for Value Creation (London: Risk Books).
24 For details see Appendix A.
9In Figure 2 and Figure 3, we show these parameters, estimated from historical data from 2000
to 2015 for our sample of 1,800 global companies, with sectors according to Bloomberg
Industrial Classification. We highlight the airline and pharmaceutical sectors with darker
colours.
Figure 2 – Investment size as a proportion of total capital
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In Figure 2, we are roughly estimating the parameter g, from historical data on Capital
Expenditure (Capex) 25 , Research & Development (R&D) and Mergers & Acquisitions
(M&A). For airlines it is 13%, with most of it coming from Capex. The estimation of these
parameters is subject to certain assumptions and should be modified on a sector by sector
basis. For example, certain sectors, such as retail, restaurants, apparel, airlines and shipping
rely on leases (not included in Capex) to fund a significant part of investments. In the case of
airlines, we include this adjustment explicitly. In other sectors, there are additional
investments, for instance marketing costs, costs of hiring new staff etc. which are not
included in Capex or R&D. It is easier for companies to estimate the figures internally based
on the expected or historical total investment size rather than for an outside investor relying
purely on public financial statements.
The estimation of expected investment return is even more difficult for an external analyst
since there is no proxy for it in financial reports. We use the “Miller-Modigliani formula”26 to
estimate it, assuming that the company earns the projected ROIC for 10 years. Results of the
formula are in Figure 3 and for airlines the expected investment return is 13.7%.
25 We exclude from Capex the maintenance Capex, which we proxy by the depreciation expense.
26 See Appendix A.
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Figure 3 – Average investment return vs. sector
In each period, various investment opportunities are presented to the companies in the
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whether to invest. If it invests, another opportunity of lower risk and reward is presented to
another randomly chosen company, until all opportunities are exhausted. No company has
more than one investment per period but some companies may not have any investment
opportunities at all. Size of investment, g, varies so that riskier and higher returning
investments have less capital invested. The average investment return offered is equal to the
average of the sector as calibrated to market data and the maximum return matches the
historical distribution.
3.4. Outputs
There are many potential outputs of our simulation. For the European airlines we show the
following ones: market share28 and investments exploited.
4. Results for the European airline sector
In this section, we are showing the results from the model for the European airline sector,
consisting of 10 publicly listed airlines in Table 2, which in 2015 together accounted for
approximately 59% of the total market by revenue29. The airlines are labelled A to J in order
to protect their confidentiality.
In Figure 4 we show the evolution of the market share of individual airlines from 2009 to
2015, based on the calibration to historical data from 2006 to 2009.
opportunities per year. The analysis can be refined by breaking the investment into a series of investments of a
realistic size. We checked that doubling the number of investments but halving their size does not impact the
results.
28 Market share is defined so that the 10 modelled airlines always add up to 100%.
29 Source: IATA. The rest is split between Middle Eastern airlines: Etihad, Emirates and Qatar Airways,
together with a group of smaller European airlines. Since these companies are not publicly listed (and many of
them have government support), it is impossible to model them due to scarcity and incomparability of financial
information.
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Figure 4 - Market Share - Actual vs. Model
Airline revenue
market share 2015
A B C D E F G H I J
actual 20% 4% 6% 23% 4% 28% 8% 1% 5% 2%
modelled 19% 4% 6% 23% 5% 30% 5% 1% 4% 3%
Table 3 - Market Share - Actual vs. Model
The upper schedule in Figure 4 shows the actual historical revenues as reported by the
companies. Companies are split into two subgroups. The smaller 7 airlines have around 5%
or less market share each, while the three biggest ones, A, D and F have between 15% and
30% of the market. The bottom schedule shows the model results. As we can see in Table 3,
our model predicts the development of market share over time correctly with the largest
discrepancy for G, where the model predicts a constant market share of 5% whereas in reality,
G’s market share increased to 8% during this period.
Even though in the case of European airlines, the model predicts the market share relatively
well, we do not suggest that the model can be used to predict future financial results. Indeed,
we showed the market share to illustrate the advantages and limitations of our model.
However, we now focus on our main objective, which is to quantify the impact of leverage on
a company’s ability to exploit investment opportunities.
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How do we evaluate the captured investments opportunities? As we have explained
previously, companies are randomly offered investment opportunities. In Figure 5, we are
showing the proportion of investments captured for different airlines over the 6 year period
2009 - 2015 as a function of leverage. Each coloured point in the graph corresponds to one
airline. We see that the highest leveraged airlines, B and D capture less than 100% of
investment opportunities offered to them. They are ‘economically constrained30’ due to a
higher investment hurdle.
In Figure 1, companies which are far to the left of the optimal leverage of 73% are
underleveraged and it is easier for them to invest as long as condition (2) is satisfied. These
companies are on the central part of the dashed line in Figure 5 (i.e. A, C, E, F, G and J).
Since the WACC curve in Figure 1 is increasing as the leverage decreases below 73%, the
more the company is underleveraged, the higher its hurdle rate on new investments. This
constrains airlines I and H. In other words, potential investments are reduced not only for
excessive leverage, beyond 73% but also for leverage which is too low, both due to the high
WACC.
Figure 5 – Average investments captured vs Average leverage (2009 – 2015) – European
airlines
This framework can be useful in estimating the level of under-investment due to high hurdle
rates, which has attracted a lot of attention lately. The confidence of many companies has
been badly shaken during the financial crisis of 2008-9, and as a result they are much more
prudent in their financial policies. As an example, in Figure 6 we show how the investments
captured would decrease if in 2009 companies used the higher WACC from 2009 (see Figure
20), instead of the average WACC through the cycle from 2000 to 2009. By ‘Economic
hurdle rates’ we mean using the average WACC from 2000 to 2009 as in the previous figure,
while ‘Risk-averse hurdle rates’ means using the 2009 WACC for the hurdle rates. We can
30 See Léautier (2007), cited earlier.
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see that the investment opportunities captured drop significantly for all but the least leveraged
firms.
Figure 6 – Underinvestment when not using through-cycle WACC
The fact that a through-cycle approach can help companies refine their hurdle rate has been
made by Marc Zenner, Evan Junek and Ram Chivukula31. From now on, we assume that the
companies act in this way and in 2009 determine their hurdle rates based on the average
WACC from 2000 to 2009.
Figure 7 shows the average return of the investments accepted by each company. We can see
that the reason why companies that are under- or over- leveraged invest less is that they are
forced to accept only the most profitable investment opportunities and forego the less
profitable ones. The other companies are able to accept the most profitable investments as
well as the less profitable ones, which allows them to grow faster.
Figure 7 - Average investment return vs Average leverage (2009 – 2015) – European airlines
31 “Bridging the Gap between Interest Rates and Investments”, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 26,
No.4, (2014), pp.75 – 80.
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The fact that there is an optimal level of WACC is not novel, and is a well-known feature of
the trade-off model once the tax shield and cost of distress are included. Our contribution is
that we add other elements to the WACC optimization that describe the nature of the industry
and competition for investments. This allows us to observe that in the airline sector there is a
fairly wide range below the optimal WACC, which allows capturing most investments.
4.1. Impact of hedging
In Figure 8 and Table 4, we show the impact of hedging on captured investment opportunities.
In order to highlight the effect, we first increase the volatility of returns on existing capital in
the sector from historically observed 7% to 21%. Then, we define the impact of hedging as
reducing the volatility of returns from 21% to zero (obviously not a realistic assumption).
Figure 8 – Impact of hedging (volatility = 21%)
A B C D E F G H I J
Leverage No Hedge 34% 71% 6% 72% 56% 10% 20% -157% -5% 48%
Leverage Full Hedge 35% 75% 8% 75% 63% 10% 21% -306% -3% 48%
Investments
captured No Hedge 91% 68% 86% 60% 81% 85% 93% 42% 74% 91%
Investments
captured Full Hedge 100% 74% 99% 63% 100% 95% 100% 42% 77% 100%
Table 4 – Impact of hedging (volatility = 21%)
We can immediately see that the impact of hedging in this hypothetical world would be, in all
cases but one, to increase the investment opportunities captured. This is hardly surprising,
since hedging helps to ensure sufficient investment capital. If we were to use the real data for
the European airlines, with volatility of returns on existing capital equal to 7%, the impact of
hedging on captured investment opportunities would be much smaller. Therefore, there must
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be alternative reasons for hedging (e.g. reduction of taxes or expected costs of financial
distress)
4.2. Case of no interaction
Let us for a moment consider a hypothetical economy with no interactions, in which any
company accepting an investment opportunity does not impact the potential opportunities for
the other companies.
In Figure 9 and Table 5, we are comparing the impact of no interactions on the market share
change from 2009 to 2015 (positive numbers correspond to an increase in the market share
and negative numbers to a reduction in the market share).
Figure 9 – Impact of no interactions
A B C D E F G H I J
Leverage 36% 75% 9% 75% 63% 12% 22% -249% -2% 49%
Market share growth
2009 - 2015 15% -9% 57% -23% -11% 8% 12% -24% 1% 28%
Market share growth
2009 - 2015 no
interactions 18% -8% 54% -21% -10% 6% 14% -25% -14% 32%
Market share change
no interactions 3% 1% -3% 2% 1% -2% 3% -1% -14% 4%
Table 5 – Impact of no interactions
We see that the less leveraged airlines F, C, I and H in a hypothetical world with no
interactions lose their market share. In contrast, the more leveraged companies gain the
market share. In this scenario, the companies are no longer competing for the same
opportunities, a process that penalises those companies with the lower flexibility.
We do not believe that the no-interaction case is realistic in a mature industry like airlines,
but this could be the case in a rapidly growing industry with a high number of growth
opportunities, e.g., internet companies during the dot-com bubble in the late nineties.
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As our last result for airlines, in Figure 10 we show the total amount invested as a percentage
of capital in the period 2009 – 2015 according to our model and we compare it with the actual
observed growth of the market share in the same period as shown previously in Figure 4.
Naturally, the two parameters are positively correlated. Of course, besides the amount
invested there are other company-specific parameters such as EBITDA margin, which also
impact the market share growth. That is why the correlation is not perfect.
Figure 10- Amount invested vs. Actual market share growth
4.3. Normal model
In the Appendices we derive the simple formula which allows determining the investments
captured for a simplified one-time static model with no interactions and assuming that the
Book value of equity is equal to Market capitalisation.
In Figure 11 we compare the results of the Normal model and the model with interactions for
the airline sector from 2010 to 2015. The inputs in the model are the expected investment
return and volatility of those returns. These parameters refer to the promised investment
returns and can be roughly estimated from the history of realised investment returns. In
Figure 11 we assumed the values of 13.7% and 6.5% respectively32.
32 Volatility of promised investment return of 6.5% has been approximated by one half of the volatility of the
historically realised investment return, which is 1.9%, while the expected promised return at 13.7% is equal to
the historically realised average investment return.
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Figure 11 – Normal model vs. model with interactions
We can see that with chosen parameters the Normal model is approximating the results of the
model with interactions fairly well. The interactions impact mostly those companies with
negative leverage or whose leverage is very high.
4.4. Results for the global pharmaceutical sector
In Figure 12 we show the results for the global pharmaceutical sector from Table 1.
Figure 12 - Average investments captured vs Average leverage (2009 – 2015) – global
pharmaceuticals
The comparison of results of the two sectors in Figure 5 and Figure 12, suggests a similar
pattern with respect to lower investments captured for companies with lower leverage.
However, as mentioned before, there are no highly leveraged companies among the largest
pharmaceutical companies. In addition, as shown in Figure 3, the average investment return
at 20.3% is higher than for airlines, so on average global pharmaceutical companies capture a
higher proportion of potential investments than European airlines.
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5. Implications for financial policy
Moving away from the airline and pharmaceutical industries, let us consider a broader
question. What is the optimal leverage of the company that allows it to grow by capturing the
largest proportion of profitable investment opportunities? A company has to overcome three
types of constraints in order to grow:
1. Economic constraints – company has a high hurdle rate (due either to high WACC
or being to the right of the minimal WACC) and it has to reject a large number of
investment opportunities which are below the hurdle rate
2. Financial constraints – company is highly leveraged so its cost of debt is high and
availability of new debt is low, reducing the possibility to finance large new
investments by debt
3. Opportunity constraints – industry has a low expected return on investments (for
instance, sectors on the top of Figure 3)
The first two constraints are specific to the company, but the third one is specific to the sector.
We assume that the company has no way of influencing sector-wide characteristics.
Economic constraints apply to organic growth opportunities of any size and to acquisitions.
Financial constraints apply only to large growth opportunities (including acquisitions), which
the company cannot finance from existing cash flows. If the company wants to maximise
growth its capital structure should take into account these constraints and adapt to them. In
Figure 13 we illustrate how economic and financial constraints can be represented on the
graphs of WACC vs. leverage and Cost of Debt vs. leverage.
Figure 13 - Economic vs. Financial constraints
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The exact location of where the blue area begins (i.e., minimum WACC or leverage above
which the company is economically constrained) depends on the sector and the expected
returns available. Similarly, the position of the red area (i.e., minimum cost of debt above
which the company is financially constrained) depends on many parameters, including
investor appetite, which changes over time.
Finally, let us now consider how industrial sector impacts the choice between economic and
financial constraints and, therefore, the optimal leverage of the company. If the industry as a
whole presents few large investment opportunities, companies are not expected to invest
much and the value of financial flexibility decreases. Consequently, the company should
minimise its hurdle rate and target the bottom of the WACC curve in Figure 13. If the
industry offers high expected investment returns or it is rapidly consolidating, financial
flexibility is paramount for the company’s growth. Hence, the company should minimise its
leverage and target the left side of Figure 13. In certain cases, the company should aim for an
intermediate financial strategy between these two extremes or even go for a riskier, higher
leverage strategy in the case of limited investment opportunities.
We hasten to add that there may be internal reasons why the company decides otherwise; for
example: rating considerations, dividend policies, etc.
5.1. Case study: optimal leverage in the food and beverage sector
The company under consideration is one of the leaders in the global food and beverage sector
that has a low leverage and a good credit rating. The first part of the project consisted in
identifying an appropriate peer group and populating the data base of financial variables for
the period 2000 – 2015. We then ran the simulation based on the expected investment size as
a proportion of total capital and expected investment return, which (see Figure 2 and Figure
3) for the food sector are around 9.3% and 16.5% respectively and for the beverage sector
6.7% and 19.8% respectively. The investment size figures were adjusted by additional
investment opportunities estimated by the firm. On the one hand, the sector is dominated by
very large global companies so that there are no sufficiently large acquisition opportunities.
During the past, the company has expanded successfully to emerging markets by adjusting its
product offering to the tastes of local consumers. In summary, the company has profitable
investment opportunities, which it needs to finance. However, on the other hand, the
company’s existing business is cash generating and predictable. Running the model on the
company and its peers allowed us to determine the optimal leverage. Our results show that it
was higher than the one company expected. In conclusion, the company should issue extra
debt and increase its dividends or stock buybacks.
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6. Conclusion
We have presented a framework which companies should use to determine optimal leverage
while taking into account the nature of their industry, competition for random growth
opportunities and the strategic flexibility to accept them. Model details are available in the
Appendices. The practical implementation of the model requires some assumptions on future
growth opportunities, which the company can determine either from the historical data or
from its own forecasts.
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Appendix A: Model flow
In this section, we describe the main steps in our model for European airlines:
1. We run 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations of key financial variables for 10 airlines in
Table 2
2. Each firm is modelled over 6 consecutive years, from 2009 to 2015. Key financial
variables modelled for each firm are:
 Income and cash flow statements: Revenue, NOPAT, Operating margin, FCFF
 Balance sheet: Invested capital, Surplus cash, Net debt
 Financial ratios: Return on Invested Capital (ROIC), net leverage (Net
Debt/Enterprise Value)
3. The returns of the firm depend on two sets of parameters: return on existing capital, x
and return on new investments, y
4. Return on existing capital, x is a Normal random variable, with average and volatility
calibrated to the historical values for the period 2000 - 2009. For example, for the
European airlines average x = 9.5% and volatility of x = 7.0%
5. Return on new investments, y is a Normal random variable, which is computed from
the Miller-Modigliani formula33:
ܧܸ = ܱܰܲܣܶ
ܹ ܣܥܥ
+ ݃ ∙ ܿܽ ݌ ݅ܽݐ ∙݈ ܰ ݕ− ܹ ܣܥܥ
ܹ ܣܥܥ(1 − ܹ ܣܥܥ)
Here g is investment as a proportion of capital and N number of years during which
the company is earning the projected return y. We are assuming that N = 1034. For
example, for European airlines average y = 13.7% and volatility of realised
investment returns y = 16.5%
6. At every time step, a company is randomly chosen among all the companies in the
sector and it is offered an ‘investment opportunity’, which is described by two
stochastic parameters, g and y. g is the size of the investment compared to the
Invested Capital and is calibrated historically, proxied by the historical ratio of Capex,
R&D and M&A expenditures to Capital. This is adjusted by the leases. y is the
expected return on the investment, as described in point 5. The company decides to
accept the investment opportunity if it increases the expected economic profit created:
EP = Capital * (ROIC – WACC). It can be shown35 that this is equivalent to:
Invested capital * Expected Return >
Total capital * Change in WACC + Invested capital * WACC
7. If the company decides not to pursue the investment, we offer the same opportunity to
another company. Once the investment is accepted or no company accepts it, another
33 See Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani, “Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares”, Journal
of Business, (September 1961), pp.411-433.
34 For details see Appendix D
35 See Léautier, Thomas-Olivier, 2007, Corporate Risk Management for Value Creation (London: Risk Books).
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investment, with a lower return y and risk vol(y) is offered to another company at
random, until the total opportunities are exhausted. No company can invest in more
than one opportunity per period, but companies can have zero opportunities. See
Figure 14 for the graph of returns and risks offered in the European airline sector36. In
this graph, the blue columns show the ‘promised investment returns. We require that,
the lowest promised return is equal to the minimum WACC (otherwise the company
would not consider the investment opportunity). The realised y can be different from
the expected return, but the company does not know the realised y until after it has
decided whether to accept the opportunity. Black error bars show the 1 standard
deviation of the distribution of realised investment opportunities, if a given
investment is accepted. In Figure 15 we show the comparison between the realised
investment returns from 2000 - 2015 and simulated investment returns from 2010 –
2015. Here we replace individual points with the average for every return bucket of
size 5%.
8. When a company decides to invest, the amount committed depends on the expected
return and risk. Since higher returns also carry higher risks, the amount that a
company invests as a proportion of total capital drops proportionally to the investment
volatility vol(y). For example, investment 1 is riskier than investment 2 since it has
higher expected returns. Therefore the amount invested in 1 is lower than investment
2 by the same ratio. This is done for each investment, until we obtain a profile
guaranteeing that the average matches the amount calculated from the market data for
each individual company. As an example, we show in Figure 16 the investments size
as a proportion of capital for company A.
Figure 14 – Return of investments offered to European airlines
36 Max return of 27.6% has been chosen so that the historical probability of investment returns greater than it is
10% = 1 over number of airlines. Min return is the lowest WACC in Figure 1.
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Figure 15 – Realised investment returns (2000 – 2015) vs. simulated investment returns
(2010 – 2015) for global airlines
Figure 16 – Investment size as percentage of capital for each investment offered for airline A
9. WACC in point 6 is computed based on net leverage. We model the market
capitalization as a constant multiple of the book value of equity. This seems like a
strong assumption, but it only impacts the WACC, which we observe to be a smooth
and slowly changing function of its arguments for a broad range of leverage. The
WACC and cost of debt as functions of leverage have been fitted to the historical data
of 1,800 companies, as shown in Appendix C.
10. Capital in the next time period is modelled by increasing the previous capital by the
returns from previous and current investments37. To this we add the amount of the
new investment, if the company accepts it. This is assumed to be funded by debt. We
can introduce the equity raising in the model, but as the Table 6 and Figure 17 show,
the amount of equity issuances are much lower than the amount of new debt financing
37 We assume that the maintenance capex is exactly offsetting the Depreciation & Amortization and that the
change in the working capital is low, but these assumptions can be relaxed.
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which justifies our approximation that large companies finance investments primarily
by issuing debt
Total issuances (USD bn) S&P Global Index, rated non-financial companies
Equity 3,000 (9%)
Debt 32,300 (91%)
Table 6 - Equity vs. Debt issuance years 2000 – 2015
Figure 17 - Equity vs. Debt issuance, S&P Global rated, non-financial companies
11. Payments to stakeholders are accounted for in the model as interest cost and dividend
repayments. Interest cost is modelled as a function of net leverage according to the
calibration procedure in Appendix C. We do not explicitly model the repayment of
the existing total debt (i.e. maturing debt is assumed to be refinanced whenever
possible), but any amount of excess cash at the end of the period is used to reduce the
net debt. In some cases, the dividend could be negligible. For instance in the
European airline sector we do not take the dividends into account (but we do for
global pharmaceutical companies) since they are very low for all the companies we
analyse except Lufthansa. In other sectors, dividends can be modelled as a constant or
increasing Dividend Payout Ratio (calibrated from historical analysis) which
multiplies the NOPAT, depending on which behaviour better fits the observed
dividend policy of the firms.
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Appendix B: Airlines
We have selected 10 largest European airlines, based on the following criteria:
 6 years of financial data from 2009 – 2015
 Revenues have to be at least 3% of the total sector
 Geographical focus on Europe
This gives us the ten airlines chosen in Table 2.
Appendix C: Fitting WACC and Cost of debt to leverage
We derive the formula relating WACC to net leverage by fitting the cost of equity and debt
separately to a sample of rated non-financial corporates from the S&P Global index, from
2000 to 2015. We exclude the non-rated companies in order to avoid the contagion of their
credit spread by a “non-rated premium”. The resulting sample comprises more than 1,800
companies from many different sectors. The resulting WACC is shown in Figure 1 and has a
minimum at 73% net leverage.
The WACC is computed using the “indirect method”:
ܹ ܣܥܥ = ܾ݀݁ ݐ
ܾ݀݁ ݐ+ ݁ݍݑ ݅ݐݕ (1 − ܽݐ ݔ)ܥௗ௘௕௧+ ݁ݍݑ ݅ݐݕܾ݀݁ ݐ+ ݁ݍݑ ݅ݐݕܥ௘௤௨௜௧௬
In addition, we impose that WACC for negative leverage is equal to the unlevered value.38
We assume the tax rate to be constant over time but different for each company, equal to its
average tax rate from 2006 to 2009.
To evaluate the cost of debt, we use the 5 year CDS39 for the companies and fit it to leverage
with an exponential formula, as shown in Figure 18:
ܥ݁ݎ ݀ ݅ݐܵ݌݁ݎ ܽ݀= ܥ ଴ܵ + ଴ܾ ∗ exp( ଵܾ ∗ ݈݁ ݒ௜)
Here we replace individual points with the average for every leverage bucket of size 5%. The
fit has an R2 = 99% and the parameters are ଴ܾ = 4.11, ଵܾ = 5.75,ܥ ଴ܵ = 82.23 .
38 See Vernimmen “Corporate Finance” (2005), pp 452.
39 Where no CDS is available, we use the CDS implied from equity via the Bloomberg function DRSK.
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Figure 18 - Credit Spread vs. Net Leverage (2000 - 2009)
To evaluate the cost of equity, we obtain a formula for β as a function of leverage. We first
compute the β as
ߚ = ܥ݋ݒ(ݎ௜,ݎெ )
ܸܽݎ(ݎெ )
for each individual company in each year, using local indices as the reference for the market
return r୑ . We use one year weekly returns for the calculation. We then fit β to leverage with
an exponential formula, as shown in Figure 19:
ߚ = 1 + ଴ܽ ∗ exp( ଵܽ ∗ ݈݁ ݒ௜)
Here we replace individual points with the average for every leverage bucket of size 5%. The
fit has an R2 = 78% and the parameters are ଴ܽ = 0.001, ଵܽ = 6.46 .
Figure 19 - Equity Beta vs. Net Leverage (2000 - 2009)
The Credit Spread and ߚ are then used to compute the cost of debt and equity via:
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ܥௗ௘௕௧= ݎ௙ + ܥ݁ݎ ݀ ݅ݐܵ݌݁ݎ ܽ݀
ܥ௘௤௨௜௧௬ = ݎ௙ + ߚ ∗ (ݎெ − ݎ௙)
We take for the risk free rate r୤the US 10 yr government bond (2000-2015 average = 3.7%
and estimate the market return r୑ = 10.0% using the discounted dividend model on the
sample of companies considered.
The WACC shown in Figure 1 aggregates all industrial sectors over the years 2000 – 2009. If
we were to look at any individual year, the graph would change.
We analyse the stability of the fit over time by calculating the WACC in 3 different years:
before the financial crisis in 2007, during the crisis in 2009 and with the most recent data in
2015. The results are shown in Figure 20. We can see that in periods of high volatility such as
in 2009, all the curves for the WACC components are steeper and the resulting WACC is
higher. In relatively less risky periods such as 2007, the WACC is less steep up to the point
that the minimum WACC is shifted to high leverage ratios. The 2015 period is in between
2009 and 2007. As previously mentioned, the WACC curve we use in the calculation is
calculated averaging the results from 2000 to 2009, therefore capturing various market
conditions. This is because if the simulation was run in 2010, we could not predict the
riskiness of the subsequent years.
Similarly, different sectors have different costs of debt, Betas, costs of equity and therefore
WACC. Our analysis can be refined by looking at the subset of the data, but in doing this, we
run into the problem that for many sectors there are not sufficient data points to extract a
sufficiently reliable WACC curve. This is why our analysis is based on a single WACC curve
depicted in Figure 1.
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Figure 20 – Stability of the WACC and its components over time
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Appendix D: Details of the model
D.1. Initial Invested Capital
Invested Capital for company ݅at time ݐis calculated from historical reported values and is
defined as:
ܥ௜(ݐ) = ܤ݋݋݇ ܧݍݑ ݅ݐݕ+ ܰ ݁ݐܦܾ݁ ݐ= ܧ௜(ݐ) + D௜(ݐ)
For example, if company A has book equity of EUR 800 m, gross debt of EUR 300 m and
cash of EUR 100 m as of FY 2009, the initial invested capital ܥ஺(0)= EUR 1,000 m.
D.2. NOPAT
Net Operating Profit After Tax (Tax rate = ௖ܶ) for company ݅at time ݐis equal to:
ࡺࡻࡼ࡭ࢀ࢏(࢚) = ࡱ࡮ࡵࢀ࢏(࢚) ∗ (૚− ࢀࢉ) = ࡯࢏(࢚) ∗ ࡾࡻࡵ࡯࢏(࢚)= ܥ௜(0) ∗ ݔ௜(ݐ) + ∑ ܥ௜( )߬ ∗ ௜݃( )߬ ∗ ݕ௜( )߬௧ఛୀ଴
Where the Return On Invested Capital for the period, ܴܱܫܥ௜(ݐ) is comprised of the return on
existing capital ݔ(ݐ) (normally distributed random number with average ݔ௠ ௘௔௡ and standard
deviation ݔ௩௢௟calibrated from historical values), the portion of capital invested at previous
periods ݃( )߬, and the return from the investment from those periods ݕ( )߬ (also random, with
mean ݕ௠ ௘௔௡ and standard deviation ݕ௩௢௟). This allows the model to keep memory of past
investments. For example, for period 1, if a company i݅nvested in period 0 and also 1, the
ܱܰܲܣ ௜ܶwould be
ܱܰܲܣ ௜ܶ(1) = ܥ௜(0) ∗ ݔ௜(1)ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ோ௘௧௨௥௡௢௙௢௥௜௚௜௡௔௟௖௔௣௜௧௔௟
+ ܥ௜(0) ∗ ൫݃ ௜(0) ∗ ݕ௜(0)൯ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ோ௘௧௨௥௡௙௥௢௠ ௣௔௦௧௜௡௩௘௦௧௠ ௘௡௧+ ܥ௜(1) ∗ ൫݃ ௜(1) ∗ ݕ௜(1)൯ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ோ௘௧௨௥௡௢௙௡௘௪௜௡௩௘௦௧௠ ௘௡௧
If it did not invest in period 1, it will still get the return from period 0
ܱܰܲܣ ௜ܶ(1) = ܥ௜(0) ∗ ݔ௜(1)ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ோ௘௧௨௥௡௢௙௢௥௜௚௜௡௔௟௖௔௣௜௧௔௟
+ ܥ௜(0) ∗ ൫݃ ௜(0) ∗ ݕ௜(0)൯ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ோ௘௧௨௥௡௙௥௢௠ ௣௔௦௧௜௡௩௘௦௧௠ ௘௡௧
This allows firms to benefit from investments for all subsequent periods.
For example, let’s say that company A has a return on capital in place ݔ஺(0) = 10% and in
the first year it invests amount g = 5% of its capital with a return of ݕ஺(0) = 20%. The
NOPAT at the end of the first year would be:
ܱܰܲܣ ஺ܶ(0) = 1,000 ∗ 10%ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ோ௘௧௨௥௡௢௙௢௥௜௚௜௡௔௟௖௔௣௜௧௔௟
+ 1,000 ∗ (5% ∗ 20%)ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ோ௘௧௨௥௡௙௥௢௠ ௡௘௪௜௡௩௘௦௧௠ ௘௡௧
= 100 + 10 = 110
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If in the second year company A invests again, this time obtaining a lower investment return
of 12% and still investing g = 5% of the new capital EUR 1,050 m, the NOPAT at the end of
year 2 would be
ܱܰܲܣ ஺ܶ(1) = 1,000 ∗ 10%ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ோ௘௧௨௥௡௢௙௢௥௜௚௜௡௔௟௖௔௣௜௧௔௟
+ 1,000 ∗ (5% ∗ 20%)ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ோ௘௧௨௥௡௙௥௢௠ ௣௔௦௧௜௡௩௘௦௧௠ ௘௡௧
+ (1,000 + 50) ∗ (5% ∗ 12%)ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ோ௘௧௨௥௡௢௙௡௘௪௜௡௩௘௦௧௠ ௘௡௧
= 110 + 6.3 = 116.3
D.3. Interaction between companies
When a firm grows, it does so by acquiring a portion of the revenues from the companies that
had a lower potential growth. This is because total sector revenues are a realistic
representation of overall market size. Potential Revenues will be calculated from
ࡼ࢕࢚ࢋ࢔࢚࢏ࢇ࢒ࡾࢋ࢜ࢋ࢔࢛ࢋ࢙࢏(࢚+ ૚) = ࡯࢏(࢚) ∗ ൫૚+ ࢍ࢏(࢚)൯࡯ࢇ࢖࢏࢚ࢇ࢒ࡵ࢔࢚ࢋ࢔࢙࢏࢚࢟࢏= ࡯࢏(࢚+ ૚)࡯ࢇ࢖࢏࢚ࢇ࢒ࡵ࢔࢚ࢋ࢔࢙࢏࢚࢟࢏ (૜)
We will assume that Capital Intensity (Capital divided by Revenues) has a constant value for
each company, equal to the value at the start of the simulation for that company. For example,
if the simulation starts in 2009, it is equal to the 2009 value for each of the successive years
until 2015.
Let’s assume company A has capital intensity = 50% in 2009. At the end of year 1, it has
capital equal to EUR 1,000 m and invested g = 5%. Therefore
ܲ݋݁ݐ ݊݅ݐܽ ݈ܴ ݁݁ݒ ݊ݑ ݁ݏ஺(1) = 1,000 ∗ (1 + 5%)50% = 2,100
This is the amount that the company would have obtained if there were no competition in the
market.
We then have to correct the value of potential revenues to take into account the competition
within the sector, which will limit the actual amount obtained during the period. We do so by
imposing that the sum of revenues over all the companies in a given period and for a certain
simulation path must be equal to a given predefined value. This value is computed by
increasing the total revenue of all the companies at the beginning of the simulation at the
constant historical growth rate. We then calculate Actual Revenues for company i as:
ܣ ܿݐݑܽ ݈ܴ ݁݁ݒ ݊ݑ ݁ݏ௜(ݐ+ 1)= ܲ݋݁ݐ ݊݅ݐܽ ݈ܴ ݁݁ݒ ݊ݑ ݁ݏ௜(ݐ+ 1) ∗ ܣ ܿݐݑܽ ݈ܵ݁ܿ ݐ݋ݎܴ ݁݁ݒ ݊ݑ ݁ݏ(ݐ+ 1)∑ ܲ݋݁ݐ ݊݅ݐܽ ݈ܴ ݁݁ݒ ݊ݑ ݁ݏ௝(ݐ+ 1)௡௝ୀଵ
For example, let us assume that the market is only comprised of two companies, A and B.
Company B has the same capital intensity = 50% and initial invested capital = EUR 1,000 m
as A, but has managed to invest more due to the lower leverage, obtaining g = 20%. In this
case we have:
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ܲ݋݁ݐ ݊݅ݐܽ ݈ܴ ݁݁ݒ ݊ݑ ݁ݏ஻(1) = 1,000 ∗ (1 + 20%)50% = 2,400
The total potential revenues for the sector are therefore
෍ ܲ݋݁ݐ ݊݅ݐܽ ݈ܴ ݁݁ݒ ݊ݑ ݁ݏ௝(1)ଶ
௝ୀଵ
= 2,100 + 2,400 = 4,500
From historical data, we calculate for example that in FY 2009 the total revenues in this two
company sector were EUR 4,000 m (2,000 for company A and 2,000 for company B) and the
historical growth rate from 2006 to 2009 was 4% per year. Therefore in the first year of the
simulation we expect the actual sector revenues to be
ܣ ܿݐݑܽ ݈ܵ݁ܿ ݐ݋ݎܴ ݁݁ݒ ݊ݑ ݁ݏ(1) = 4,000 ∗ (1 + 4%) = 4,160
This is higher than the sum of potential revenues of the two companies of 4,500 and we have
to adjust the actual revenues they can obtain:
ܣ ܿݐݑܽ ݈ܴ ݁݁ݒ ݊ݑ ݁ݏ஺(1) = 2,100 ∗ 4,1604,500 = 1,940
ܣ ܿݐݑܽ ݈ܴ ݁݁ݒ ݊ݑ ݁ݏ஻(1) = 2,400 ∗ 4,1604,500 = 2,220
Therefore, Company A revenues were expected to grow by EUR 100 m, and instead shrink
by EUR 60 m because of market competition. Similarly, Company B revenues grow by just
EUR 220 m instead of EUR 500 m. The market share of company A is reduced from 50% to
47%, because company B gained 3% market share by investing more than company A.
Note that this kind of adjustment is justified in mature markets, which can be assumed to
grow at a historical rate, with no space for further growth. In rapidly growing markets, the
assumption would not be valid, since the companies cannot ‘crowd each other’.
We can now modify the NOPAT (modified or actual NOPAT is symbolised with a _ sign) to
reflect this actual revenue. Note that we do not modify the capital in the same way, since the
capital invested by a company in the past should be independent on its peers. However, the
NOPAT obtained from the invested capital, instead, is influenced by the competition:
ܱܰܲܣܶതതതതതതതതതത௜(ݐ+ 1) = ܣ ܿݐݑܽ ݈ܴ ݁݁ݒ ݊ݑ ݁ݏ௜(ݐ+ 1) ∗ ܱ݌ ݁ܽݎ ݅ݐ݊݃ܯܽ݃ݎ ݅݊ ௜(ݐ+ 1)
To calculate the Operating margin, we use the relationship:
ܱ݌ ݁ܽݎ ݅ݐ݊݃ܯܽ݃ݎ ݅݊ ௜(ݐ+ 1) = ܴܱܫܥ௜(ݐ+ 1) ∗ ܥܽ݌ ݅ܽݐ ݈݊ܫ ݁ݐ ݊݅ݏݐݕ௜
Therefore the actual NOPAT becomes:
ܱܰܲܣܶതതതതതതതതതത௜(ݐ+ 1) = ܣ ܿݐݑܽ ݈ܴ ݁݁ݒ ݊ݑ ݁ݏ௜(ݐ+ 1) ∗ ܴܱܫܥ௜(ݐ+ 1) ∗ ܥܽ݌ ݅ܽݐ ݈݊ܫ ݁ݐ ݊݅ݏݐݕ௜
Since ܱܰܲܣ ௜ܶ(ݐ+ 1) = ܥ௜(ݐ+ 1) ∗ ܴܱܫܥ௜(ݐ+ 1),
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ܱܰܲܣܶതതതതതതതതതത௜(ݐ+ 1) = ܣ ܿݐݑܽ ݈ܴ ݁݁ݒ ݊ݑ ݁ݏ௜(ݐ+ 1) ∗ ܱܰܲܣ ௜ܶ(ݐ+ 1)ܥ௜(ݐ+ 1) ∗ ܥܽ݌ ݅ܽݐ ݈݊ܫ ݁ݐ ݊݅ݏݐݕ௜
Using (3) we obtain:
ܰ ܱܲܣܶതതതതതതതതതത௜(ݐ+ 1) = ܣ ܿݐݑܽ ݈ܴ ݁݁ݒ ݊ݑ ݁ݏ௜(ݐ+ 1)ܲ݋݁ݐ ݊݅ݐܽ ݈ܴ ݁݁ݒ ݊ݑ ݁ݏ௜(ݐ+ 1) ∗ ܱܰܲܣ ௜ܶ(ݐ+ 1)
and since we imposed that ܥ௜(ݐ) does not change, the renormalisation corresponds to
changing the ROIC for the period.
The reason we do not use operating margin from the market in place of capital intensity is
that the former is much more volatile than the latter, and it should be related to ROIC.
For example, Company A had a NOPAT of EUR 110 m (see previous section), real revenues
of EUR 1,940 m and potential revenues of EUR 2,100 m. The actual NOPAT obtained is
therefore reduced to:
ܱܰܲܣܶതതതതതതതതതത஺(1) = 1,9402,100 ∗ 110 = 102
Therefore, the competition in a mature market has reduced the NOPAT for company A by
EUR 8 m. Obviously, the impact of competition depends on the capital, capital intensity and
investment size g for different companies. As we will see, the consequences of
underinvesting in earlier years impact future years through a progressively higher leverage
leading to reduced investments and thus to a progressively reduced market share.
D.4. FCFF
Free Cash Flows to the Firm (FCFF) for company ݅are defined by:
ܨܥܨܨ௜(ݐ) = ܱܰܲܣܶതതതതതതതതതത௜(ݐ) + ܦ&ܣ௜(ݐ) − Δܹ ܥ௜(ݐ) − ܿܽ ݌ ݁ݔ௜(ݐ)
Where:
ܿܽ ݌ ݁ݔ௜(ݐ) = ݉ܽ݅݊ ݁ݐ ݊ܽ݊ܿ݁ ܿܽ݌ ݁ݔ௜(ݐ) + ܥ௜(ݐ) ∗ ௜݃(ݐ),
Here we make two approximations:
ܦ&ܣ௜(ݐ) − ݉ܽ݅݊ ݁ݐ ݊ܽ݊ܿ݁ ܿܽ݌ ݁ݔ௜(ݐ) ≃ 0,
Δܹ ܥ௜(ݐ) ≃ 0
In practice we noticed that in the airline and pharmaceutical sectors, these approximations
work well, but it is easy to remove them in a general case.
Hence we have:
ܨܥܨܨ௜(ݐ) = ܱܰܲܣܶതതതതതതതതതത௜(ݐ) − ܥ௜(ݐ) ∗ ௜݃(ݐ)
The free cash flow generated is available for paying shareholders and debt holders.
For Company A, following the examples in previous sections, we have
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ܨܥܨܨ஺(1) = 102 − 1,000 ∗ 5% = 52
D.5. Surplus Cash
The cash generated is used to fund the payout to investors incurred during the period:
a) Pay interest on debt
We calculate interest assuming the interest paid is the cost of total debt
݊ܫ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐܧݔ݌݁݊ ݁ݏ ௜(ݐ) = (D௜(ݐ) + Cash୧(ݐ)) ∗ ܥௗ௘௕௧(݈݁ ݒ௜) ∗ (1 − ௖ܶ)
Here ܦ௜(ݐ) is net debt of the company, ௖ܶ is the tax rate and ܥௗ௘௕௧(݈݁ ݒ௜) is the cost of
debt, as a function of leverage, which is explained later.
For Company A, assuming ܥௗ௘௕௧(݈݁ ݒ௜) = 2% and ௖ܶ = 30% this equals to:
݊ܫ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐܧݔ݌݁݊ ݁ݏ ஺(1) = 300 ∗ 2% ∗ (1 − 30%) = 4.2
b) Cash from financing activities / debt repayment
We add back the new debt issuance since it corresponds to a cash injection. We
assume that the capital expenditure is financed through new debt issuance:
ܥܽݏℎ݂ݎ݋݉ ݀ ܾ݁ ݐ݅ݏݏݑܽ݊ܿ݁ = ܥ௜(ݐ) ∗ ௜݃(ݐ)
Here Capex = ܥ௜(ݐ) ∗ ௜݃(ݐ)
In principle, the company could raise less debt if it uses the cash reserves instead, but
the impact on net debt will be the same.
c) Pay dividend
We include the payment of dividend as a constant Dividend Payout Ratio ߙ௜:
ܦ ݅݅ݒ ݀݁݊ ݀ܲ ܽ݅݀ ௜(ݐ) == (ܨܥܨܨ௜(ݐ) − ݊ܫ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐܧݔ݌݁݊ ݁ݏ ௜(ݐ) + ܥܽݏℎ݂ݎ݋݉ ݀ ܾ݁ ݐ݅ݏݏݑܽ݊ܿ݁ ௜(ݐ))
∗ ߙ௜
For the simulation, we calculate ߙ௜from the median historical dividend payout ratio
for each company from 2006 to 2009.
In some cases, the dividend could be negligible. For the airlines, we do not take the
dividends into account since they are very low for all the companies we analyse
except one, so for airlines, ߙ௜= 0
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The remainder is surplus cash:
Δܥܽݏℎ௜(ݐ) == ܨܥܨܨ௜(ݐ) − ݊ܫ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐܧݔ݌݁݊ ݁ݏ ௜(ݐ) − ܦ ݅݅ݒ ݀݁݊ ݀ܲ ܽ݅݀ ௜(ݐ)+ ܥܽݏℎ݂ݎ݋݉ ݀ ܾ݁ ݐ݅ݏݏݑܽ݊ܿ݁ ௜(ݐ)= ܱܰܲܣܶതതതതതതതതതത௜(ݐ) − ܥ௜(ݐ) ∗ ௜݃(ݐ) − ݊ܫ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐܧݔ݌݁݊ ݁ݏ ௜(ݐ) − ܦ ݅݅ݒ ݀݁݊ ݀ܲ ܽ݅݀ ௜(ݐ) + ܥ௜(ݐ)
∗ ௜݃(ݐ)= ܱܰܲܣܶതതതതതതതതതത௜(ݐ) − ݊ܫ ݁ݐ ݁ݎ ݏݐܧݔ݌݁݊ ݁ݏ ௜(ݐ) − ܦ ݅݅ݒ ݀݁݊ ݀ܲ ܽ݅݀ ௜(ݐ)
We assume that all surplus cash generated goes in retained earnings:
Δܥܽݏℎ௜(ݐ) = Δܴ ݁ܽݐ ݅݊ ݁݀ ܧܽ݊ݎ ݅݊ ݃ݏ௜(ݐ)
For example, for Company A we obtain:
Δܥܽݏℎ௜(ݐ) = Δܴ ݁ܽݐ ݅݊ ݁݀ ܧܽ݊ݎ ݅݊ ݃ݏ௜(ݐ) = 102 − 4 − 0 = 98
D.6. Invested Capital evolution, retained earnings, surplus cash
Having calculated the surplus cash, we can now use it to compute the capital at next iteration.
Since we assume that the investment is founded by debt, the increase in net debt is equal to
the capex minus the increase in cash:
ઢࡰ࢏(࢚) = ࡯࢏(࢚) ∗ ࢍ࢏(࢚) − ઢ࡯ࢇ࢙ࢎ࢏(࢚) (૝)
The cash also represents retained earnings on the balance sheet which increase book equity at
next period, therefore we have:E୧(t + 1) = E୧(t) + Δܥܽݏℎ௜(ݐ),
Using (4):D୧(t + 1) = D୧(t) + ΔD௜(ݐ) = D௜(ݐ) + ܥ௜(ݐ) ∗ ௜݃(ݐ) − Δܥܽݏℎ௜(ݐ),C୧(t + 1) = E୧(t + 1) + D௜(ݐ+ 1)= ܥ௜(ݐ) + Δܥܽݏℎ௜(ݐ) + ܥ௜(ݐ) ∗ ௜݃(ݐ) − Δܥܽݏℎ௜(ݐ)= ܥ௜(ݐ) ∗ ൫1 + ௜݃(ݐ)൯
Recovering the result from Leautier40.
For Company A we have thereforeE୅(1) = 800 + 98 = 898,D୅(1) = 200 + 50 − 98 = 152,C୅(1) = 898 + 152 = 1,050
40 Leautier, (2007), cited earlier, pp 194.
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D.7. Investment opportunity
At each period, N investment opportunities are presented to the companies in the sector. The
first opportunity is presented to a company at random and it decides whether to invest or not.
If it invests, another opportunity with lower risk and return is presented to another company
at random, until the total opportunities are exhausted. If it does not invest, the same
opportunity is offered to another company at random. No company can have more than one
opportunity per path per period (but can have 0).
The expected return of the investment, ݕ௠ ௘௔௡ is different for each investment according to a
simple exponential formula:
ܡܕ ܍܉ܖ = ܉∗ ܍ି܊∗ܖ + ܋(૞)
Where n is the investment number (for example, first, second, third investment offered etc.)
and the parameters a, b and c are calibrated to the implied distribution of returns obtained
historically for the sector. Details can be found in the calibration section. For the airline
sector, we obtained a = 21.5%, b = 36.2%, c = 6.2%.
Choice of parameters is such that the average of all N investments ݕ௠ ௘௔௡ is equal to the
average investment return for the sector, and the maximum ݕത௠ ௔௫ is such that in the
distribution of implied sector returns41 there is 1/ܰ probability that returns are above that
value. For example, if there are ܰ = 10 investments, we choose ݕത௠ ௔௫ so that the probability
according to the normal distribution that the historical implied returns are above ݕത௠ ௔௫ is1/ܰ = 10%. In addition, the minimum ݕത௠ ௜௡ is chosen to be equal to the minimum WACC,
since in our model there would be no reason to invest if the expected return is below the
minimum WACC and such investment would in that case never be chosen. For the airline
sector the average return is 13.7% and the standard deviation is 16.5%, and the maximum
return of the investments offered is 30.3%42.
As we decrease the expected investment return ݕ௠ ௘௔௡ we also reduce its volatility
ݕ௩௢௟by the same proportion, so that different investments have the same risk / return ratio.
We also increase the proportion of capital invested in the opportunity g by the same ratio, to
ensure that riskier and higher returning investments have less capital invested in them.
Example: In Figure 12, first investment has ݕ௠ ௘௔௡ = ݕത௠ ௔௫ = 27.6%. Second investment is
reduced according to the formula (5) so that ݕത= 21.1%, etc. For the first investment, ݕ௩௢௟=
24.1% and the second one is reduced proportionately to 21.1%/27.6% * 24.1% = 18.4%. Size
of the first investment is g = 4.1% and the second investment is increased proportionately to
27.6%/21.1% * 4.1% = 5.4%.
The companies deem an opportunity profitable, and they invest in it, if it increases the
expected economic profit created43
41 We assume that the investment returns have a normal distribution with the same average and standard
deviation as the actual historical distribution of implied returns. See details in the calibration section.
42 N(30.3%) = 90% = 1 – 1/10, where N – cumulative normal distribution with mean 13.7% and standard
deviation 16.5%.
43 Leautier (2007), cited earlier, pp 197
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ܧ[Δܧ ௜ܲ] = ܧ[ܧ ௜ܲ(݅݊ ݁ݒ ݏ݉ݐ ݁݊ ݐ)] − ܧ[ܧ ௜ܲ(݊݋݅݊ ݁ݒ ݏ݉ݐ ݁݊ ݐ)] ≥ 0
Where
ܧ[ܧ ௜ܲ(݅݊ ݁ݒ ݏ݉ݐ ݁݊ ݐ)]= ܥ௜(ݐ) ∗ ൣܴ ܱܫܥ௜(ݐ) + ௜݃(ݐ) ∗ ݕ௠ ௘௔௡ − ܹ ܣܥܥ௜൫݈ ݁ݒ௜( ௜݃(ݐ)൯∗ ൫1 + ௜݃(ݐ)൯൧
ܧ[ܧ ௜ܲ(݊݋݅݊ ݁ݒ ݏ݉ݐ ݁݊ ݐ)] = ܥ௜(ݐ) ∗ ൣܴ ܱܫܥ௜(ݐ) − ܹ ܣܥܥ௜൫݈ ݁ݒ௜(݃ = 0)൯൧
Therefore we have:
ܧ[Δܧ ௜ܲ] = ܥ௜(ݐ)
∗ ൣ݃ ௜(ݐ) ∗ ݕ௠ ௘௔௡ − ܹ ܣܥܥ௜൫݈ ݁ݒ௜( ௜݃(ݐ)൯∗ ൫1 + ௜݃(ݐ)൯+ ܹ ܣܥܥ௜൫݈ ݁ݒ௜(݃ = 0)൯൧≥ 0
This can be simplified to
܏ (ܑܜ) ∗ ܡܕ ܍܉ܖᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
۳ܠܘ܍܋ܜ܍܌ܚ܍ܜܝܚܖ
≥ ܅ ۯ۱۱ ൫ܑܔ܍ܑܞ(܏ (ܑܜ)൯− ܅ ۯ۱۱ ൫ܑܔ܍ܑܞ(܏= ૙)൯ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
۱ܐ܉ܖ܏܍ܑܖ܋ܗܛܜܗܖܜܐ܍܍ܑܠ ܛܑܜܖ܏܋܉ܘ ܑܜ܉ܔ+ ܏ (ܑܜ) ∗ ܅ ۯ۱۱ ൫ܑܔ܍ܑܞ(܏ (ܑܜ)൯ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
۱ܗܛܜܗ܎ܜܐ܍ܖ܍ܟ܋܉ܘ ܑܜ܉ܔ
(૟)
Hence, the expected investment return must be superior to the expected increase in the cost of
existing capital plus the cost of new capital.
For example, let us assume Company C and Company D have a leverage of 80% and 30%
respectively. An opportunity of ݕത= 7.0% expected return is offered to Company C and the
management decides they would invest in it a proportion ஼݃(0) = 17% of capital if the
investment is profitable, and fund it by debt issuance. Let us assume that the leverage would
consequently increase by 5% to 85%, leading to an increase in WACC from 7.2% to 7.6%.
Equation (6) yields:
17.0% ∗ 7.0%ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ா௫௣௘௖௧௘ௗ௥௘௧௨௥௡
≥ 7.6% − 7.2%ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
஼௛௔௡௚௘௜௡௖௢௦௧௢௡௧௛௘௘௫௜௦௧௜௡௚௖௔௣௜௧௔௟
+ 17.0% ∗ 7.6%ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
஼௢௦௧௢௙௧௛௘௡௘௪௖௔௣௜௧௔௟
⇒
1.2% ≥ 0.4% + 1.3%, which is false, so the company does not invest.
Since the leverage of Company C is above the optimal leverage of 73%, increasing leverage
increases the WACC, thus the investment return required has to compensate for both the cost
of new capital and the increased cost of outstanding capital. Since this is not the case,
Company C does not invest in the opportunity since it would reduce the economic profit, thus
the company value. Therefore, the same opportunity is offered to Company D, which has a
leverage of 30%. Let us assume that the amount Company D chooses to invest in the
opportunity is still ஽݃(0) = 17% for simplicity and that the leverage would consequently
increase by 5% to 35%, leading this time to a decrease in WACC from 9.5% to 9.1%.
Equation (6) now yields:
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17.0% ∗ 7.0%ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ா௫௣௘௖௧௘ௗ௥௘௧௨௥௡
≥ 9.1% − 9.5%ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
஼௛௔௡௚௘௜௡௖௢௦௧௢௡௧௛௘௘௫௜௦௧௜௡௚௖௔௣௜௧௔௟
+ 17.0% ∗ 9.1%ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
஼௢௦௧௢௙௧௛௘௡௘௪௖௔௣௜௧௔௟
⇒
1.2% ≥ −0.4% + 1.5%, which is true, so the company invests.
Since leverage of the Company D is below the optimal WACC, despite the fact that the final
cost of capital of 9.1% would be above the expected investment return of 7.0%, they would
still invest in the opportunity since the increase in leverage would also reduce the cost of all
outstanding capital by 0.4%.
D.8. Deriving the WACC from net debt and estimate market
capitalisation
The leverage is calculated from net debt and market capitalisation. To calculate the market
capitalisation, we keep the ratio ߛbetween market capitalisation and book equity constant to
the historical value at the start of the simulation, for example FY 2009:
ߛ௜= ܯܽ݇ݎ ݁ݐܥܽ݌ ݅ܽݐ ݈݅ܽݏ ݅ݐ݋݊ ௜(ݐ)ܧ௜(ݐ) = ܯܽ݇ݎ ݁ݐܥܽ݌ ݅ܽݐ ݈݅ܽݏ ݅ݐ݋݊ ௜(2009)ܧ௜(2009)
If the company does not invest, hence ௜݃(ݐ) = 0, the leverage is calculated as:
lev୧(g = 0) = D୧(ݐ)ܦ௜(ݐ) + ܯܽ݇ݎ ݁ݐܥܽ݌ ݅ܽݐ ݈݅ܽݏ ݅ݐ݋݊ ௜(ݐ) = D୧(ݐ)ܦ௜(ݐ) + ܧ௜(ݐ) ∗ ߛ௜
If the company invests, it will fund the investment through debt issuance. Since the invested
amount is ܥ௜(ݐ) ∗ ௜݃(ݐ), the debt is going to rise by that value. Therefore, the leverage after
the investment will increase:
lev୧൫g୧(t)൯= D୧(ݐ) + ܥ௜(ݐ) ∗ ௜݃(ݐ)D୧(ݐ) + ܥ௜(ݐ) ∗ ௜݃(ݐ) + ܧ௜(ݐ) ∗ ߛ௜
This is used for the calculation of WACC using the formula (see Figure 1):
ቊ
ܹ ܣܥܥ௜(lev୧) = (1 − lev୧) ∗ ܥ௘௤௨௜௧௬(lev୧) + lev୧∗ ܥௗ௘௕௧(lev୧) ∗ (1 − ௖ܶ)݂݅ lev୧> 0
ܹ ܣܥܥ௜(lev୧) = ܥ௘௤௨௜௧௬(lev୧= 0)݂݅ lev୧≤ 0
Where ௖ܶ is the tax rate, ܥ௘௤௨௜௧௬ is the cost of equity and ܥௗ௘௕௧ is the cost of debt. The
variation of ܥ௘௤௨௜௧௬ and ܥௗ௘௕௧ with leverage has been derived by fit to market data, as
described in the Appendix C.
For example, let’s take Company A that has initial book equity of EUR 800 m, gross debt of
EUR 300 m and cash of EUR 100 m, thus the net debt equals EUR 200 m. If we assume that
the Market Capitalisation at FY 2009 is EUR 1,800m, we obtain:
ߛ஺ = 1,800800 = 2.25
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And the leverage is: lev୅(g = 0) = 200200 + 1,800 = 10.0%
Consider an investment opportunity offered to Company A which requires it to invest an
additional g = 5% portion of capital. If the opportunity is taken, the leverage would grow to
lev୅൫g୅(0)൯= 200 + 1,000 ∗ 5%200 + 1,000 ∗ 5% + 1,800 = 13.5%
This new leverage will be used in the WACC formula to evaluate the overall cost of capital
achieved if the opportunity is taken, that will determine if the company will invest in it or not
using the methodology described in the previous paragraph.
Appendix E: Model inputs calibration
E.1. Return on existing capital: x
The parameter ݔ௜(ݐ) for company r݅epresents the return of the capital already employed by
the company at the time the simulation starts.
For each company, we calculate ݔ௠ ௘௔௡ from the median of the yearly historical ROIC from
the years 2000 to 2009. For companies without previous history, we use the average of the
peers as proxy to calculate the statistics. The yearly sector average is also used to obtain the
expected volatility of returns ݔ௩௢௟from its standard deviation.
E.2. Capital intensity
Capital intensity is taken from historical data in 2009. Capital intensity is calculated as:
ܥܽ݌ ݅ܽݐ ݈݊ܫ ݁ݐ ݊݅ݏݐݕ= ݋ܾ݋݇ ݁ݍݑ ݅ݐݕ+ ݊ ݁ݐ݀ ܾ݁ ݐ
ܴ ݁݁ݒ ݊ݑ ݁ݏ
We assume that this is constant throughout the simulation.
E.3. Calibration of g and Invested Capital
To calculate g, which is defined as the proportion of capital that is invested yearly by a given
company, we first proxy the invested capital as
݊ܫ ݁ݒ ݏ݁ݐ ݀ܥܽ݌ ݅ܽݐ ௜݈(ݐ) = [ܥܽ݌ ݁ݔ௜(ݐ) + ܴ&ܦ݁ݔ݌݁݊ ݁ݏ ௜(ݐ) + ܯ&ܣ݁ݔ݌݁݊ ݁ݏ ௜(ݐ)] ∗
∗ (1 −%݋݂ ܦ ݌݁݁ݎ ܿ݅ܽ݅ݐ݋݊ ݁ݔ݌݁݊ ݁ݏ ௦௘௖௧௢௥)
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As we mentioned earlier, we subtract the depreciation expense since we assume that it is
equal to maintenance capex, and we are only interested in new investments. The percentage
of depreciation expense is calculated on a sector basis and is kept constant over time and on
each company in a given sector.
After we have obtained the Invested Capital, we calculate g as
௜݃(ݐ) = ݊ܫ ݁ݒ ݏ݁ݐ ݀ܥܽ݌ ݅ܽݐ ௜݈(ݐ)ܥ௜(ݐ− 1)
We divide by the capital from the previous year since the capital for this year already
contains the newly invested capital.
For the simulation input parameters, g is calibrated using the average of the historical results
from the previous 5 years. For example, if 2009 is chosen, we use historical data from 2005
to 2009. For companies without previous history, we use the average of the peers as proxy to
calculate the statistics.
For the calculation of y described below, g is calculated over the companies within the S&P
global index for each individual sector, from 2000 to 2015.
E.4. Return on new investments: y
We calculate the y(t) value implied by the current enterprise value of the company, similarly
as we did for x. This is the expected return of the new investments this year, net of the return
from the existing investments x(t). We assume that the Enterprise value can be calculated via
the Miller-Modigliani formula44:
ܧ݊݁ݐ ݎ݌݅ݎ ݁ݏ ܸ ܽ ݈ݑ (݁ݐ)= ܱܰܲܣܶ(ݐ)
ܹ ܣܥܥ(ݐ)ᇣᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇥ
௏௔௟௨௘௢௙௔௦௦௘௧௦௜௡௣௟௔௖௘+ ܭ(ݐ) ∗ ܱܰܲܣܶ(ݐ) ∗ ܰ ∗ ݕ(ݐ) − ܹ ܣܥܥ(ݐ)
ܹ ܣܥܥ(ݐ) ∗ [1 + ܹ ܣܥܥ(ݐ)]ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
௏௔௟௨௘௢௙௚௥௢௪௧௛
Where
ܭ(ݐ) ∗ ܱܰܲܣܶ(ݐ) = ݊ܫ ݁ݒ ݏ݁ݐ ݀ܥܽ݌ ݅ܽݐ ݈(ݐ) = ௜݃(ݐ) ∗ ܥ௜(ݐ)
ܰ = Expected number of years that the company will continue to benefit from the investment.
We can invert this formula to obtain y(t), yielding
44 See Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani, “Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares”, Journal
of Business, (September 1961), pp.411-433. Also Copeland et al., “Valuation”, pp 154 and Copeland et al.,
“Financial Theory and Corporate Policy”, pp 505-506
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ݕ(ݐ) = ቈܧ݊݁ݐ ݎ݌݅ݎ ݁ݏ ܸ ܽ ݈ݑ (݁ݐ) − ܱܰܲܣܶ(ݐ)
ܹ ܣܥܥ(ݐ) ቉∗ ܹ ܣܥܥ(ݐ) ∗ [1 + ܹ ܣܥܥ(ݐ)]݊ܫ ݁ݒ ݏ݁ݐ ݀ܥܽ݌ ݅ܽݐ ݈(ݐ) ∗ ܰ + ܹ ܣܥܥ(ݐ)
We make the simplifying assumption that N = 10 years45. We use the formula to compute the
yearly implied investment return y(t) for each company in each year from 2000 to 201546.
The average y for all companies is 18.7%, while the average for the airlines is 13.7%, with a
standard deviation of 16.5%. For Pharmaceutical companies we instead obtain an average of
20.3% with a standard deviation of 12.4%.
E.5. Calibration of tax rate
The tax rate for each company is calculated as the average effective tax rate between the
years 2000 to 2009.
E.6. Derivation of Analytical investment probability for one firm
We want to have an analytical derivation of the investment probability given the leverage for
a firm, in absence of interactions.
We start from the investment formula (6), which we reproduce dropping the t dependence
below for ease of reading:
܏ܑ∗ ܡܕ ܍܉ܖᇣᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇥ
۳ܠܘ܍܋ܜ܍܌ܚ܍ܜܝܚܖ
≥ ܅ ۯ۱۱ (ܑܔ܍ܑܞ(܏ )ܑ − ܅ ۯ۱۱ ൫ܑܔ܍ܑܞ(܏= ૙)൯ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
۱ܐ܉ܖ܏܍ܑܖ܋ܗܛܜܗܖܜܐ܍܍ܑܠ ܛܑܜܖ܏܋܉ܘ ܑܜ܉ܔ
+ ܏ܑ∗ ܅ ۯ۱۱ (ܑܔ܍ܑܞ(܏ )ܑᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
۱ܗܛܜܗ܎ܜܐ܍ܖ܍ܟ܋܉ܘ ܑܜ܉ܔ
We know from the WACC calibration that the function WACC୧൫lev୧(g୧(t)൯has an explicit
formulation:
ቊ
ܹ ܣܥܥ௜(lev୧) = (1 − lev୧) ∗ ܥ௘௤௨௜௧௬(lev୧) + lev୧∗ ܥௗ௘௕௧(lev୧) ∗ (1 − ௖ܶ)݂݅ lev୧> 0
ܹ ܣܥܥ௜(lev୧) = ܥ௘௤௨௜௧௬(lev୧= 0)݂݅ lev୧≤ 0
And for the leverage:lev୧(g୧) = D୧+ C୧∗ g୧D୧+ C୧∗ g୧+ E୧∗ γ୧ܽ݊݀ݐℎݑݏlev୧(0) = D୧D୧+ E୧∗ γ୧
Without loss of generality, we make the simplifying assumption γ୧= 1 so that the leverage
becomes lev୧(0) = D୧D୧+ ܧ௜= D୧C୧ܽ݊݀lev୧(g୧) = D୧+ C୧∗ g୧C୧∗ (1 + g୧) = lev୧(0) + ௜݃1 + ௜݃
We can then re-arrange equation (6) to get the formula for the minimum return required for
the investment to be accepted
45 This is close to the average from 2000 to 2015 for all the sectors of the asset replacement period defined as
fixed assets + intangible assets divided by depreciation and amortisation.
46 We exclude extreme implied values of more than 50% and less than -50%, which are unrealistic, and
instances when the invested capital as a percentage of capital is below 5%.
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y௔௖௖௘௣௧௘ௗ(lev୧(0), g୧) ≥ WACC୧(lev୧(g୧) −WACC୧൫lev୧(g = 0)൯
௜݃
+ WACC୧(lev୧(g୧)
This is an explicit function of both the initial leverage lev୧(0) and the amount invested g୧.
Given a leverage lev୧(0) and an amount invested g୧, we can then calculate y௔௖௖௘௣௧௘ௗ, the
minimum investment return that could be accepted by the company.
We can infer the distribution of returns of the possible investments offered to the company
from the distribution of realised returns for the sector that we can observe in the market. For
example, for the Airlines sector this distribution has average 13.7% and standard deviation
16.5%. Out of those investments, only the ones with returns above the minimum WACC of
7.0% could be offered to the management. The average return should match the one observed
in the market, equal to 13.7%.
We can approximate such distribution with a normal distribution with average of ߤ௣௢௦௦௜௕௟௘ =13.7% and standard deviation of ߪ௣௢௦௦௜௕௟௘ = 8.3% = ଵ଺.ହΨଶ .
Therefore the probability pୟୡୡୣ ୮୲ୣ ୢ of accepting an investment with return y௔௖௖௘௣௧௘ௗ is equal
to the probability that the distribution of y௣௢௦௦௜௕௟௘is above that level. This can be easily
calculated aspୟୡୡୣ ୮୲ୣ ୢ(lev୧(0), g୧) = 1 − N ൣݕ௔௖௖௘௣௧௘ௗ(lev୧(0), g୧),ߤ௣௢௦௦௜௕௟௘,ߪ௣௢௦௦௜௕௟௘൧
This is an explicit formula that links the probability of accepting an investment with the
present leverage of the company lev୧(0) and the amount is willing to invest g୧.
